## IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GEORGE R. HODGES
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

## **APPEARANCES:**

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2 1 THE COURT: Now, how about The Hammocks? Can we do 2 that? 3 MS. MANN: I am sorry. Which one, Your Honor? 4 THE COURT: The Hammocks. 5 MR. GRAY: Your Honor, David Gray, attorney for the 6 debtor and debtor-in-possession. 7 MR. YNTEMA: Brady Yntema for Harleysville Mutual 8 Insurance Company; and with me today is Mike Nelson of the 9 Pennsylvania bar. We have previously filed a motion pro hac vice and a proposed order. I guess, as of Monday, Mr. Nelson 10 was able to provide me with a certificate of good standing on 11 Monday, and I immediately turned around and filed it. I do not 12 13 think there is an objection from Mr. Gray. I will be arguing 14 as part of the bar of North Carolina and admitted in the 15 Western District -16 THE COURT: Well, that's fine. We will admit him, if we haven't signed the order already. So we will allow you all 17 18 to participate however you want. 19 MR. YNTEMA: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate that. 20 MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 MR. YNTEMA: Also, I just have - and this makes me 22 comfortable. I know the court doesn't want more documents at 23 their fingertips, but if I could approach the court and just hand up an appendix of case law, please. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MANN: Your Honor, I would just like to announce Marjorie Mann for the Michaels, the loss payees.

THE COURT: Who are your clients again?

MS. MANN: The Michaels.

MR. GRAY: They are the mortgage holders of the property.

MS. MANN: They are the mortgage holders.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. YNTEMA: Your Honor, if I may just explain the appendix I just handed up. It is just an appendix of the case law that I may be referring to today. The first two pages are probably what the court can look at in brief while I go through the argument. The case law that I cite has a little narrative after each case telling you what the case essentially is about and why I am citing to it.

This is Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company's motion for relief from the automatic stay in this case. Harleysville Mutual has attached to its motion for relief from stay a declaratory judgment complaint that they wish to pursue in the Western District of North Carolina.

That declaratory judgment complaint requests a declaratory judgment declaring the rights and obligations of the parties to an insurance policy that provided property coverage to a location of the Richmond Hill Inn. The policy was issued in October of 2008.

A fire occurred on the premises of the Richmond Hill Inn in March of 2008 - of 2009, I apologize, and shortly thereafter a petition was filed for bankruptcy in this case by The Hammocks. The Hammocks being the owners of the Richmond Hill Inn. The fire destroyed what has been termed "The Mansion" on the Richmond Hill Inn, I guess I could say campus.

In May of 2009, this year, a proof of loss was submitted, a purported proof of loss was submitted to Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company asserting in excess of six million dollars, and that was asserted on behalf of The Hammocks, LLC.

Thereafter an investigation did ensue as to the claim that was submitted to Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company. As part of that investigation, an EUO was conducted of The Hammocks. It was requested and it was demanded under the policy of insurance. That was conducted outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. There was no objection.

Prior to that EUO, an examination under oath, Ron Payne was specially appointed by this court to appear for The Hammocks and handle the matters with regard to the insurance claim and any litigation that may ensue as to that claim.

Ron Payne was there at the examination under oath, and the managing member for The Hammocks, Dr. Gray, was presented for the examination under oath and to answer questions as to various matters. The EUO took place over, I think, a two-day

period of time.

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Thereafter, a further investigation and analysis of the claim took place by Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company and, at a given point, they determined that there was no coverage under their policy; and, in essence, there were two grounds that they decided to deny the claim.

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The first ground being that there were misrepresentations in the application. Those misrepresentations had the effect of voiding the policy -

MR. GRAY: Your Honor, we would object to this. This doesn't have anything to do with the relief from stay. It has to do with the allegations of this declaratory judgment action, which are not proved at this point, and Mr. Yntema is testifying at this point. We would object to any allegations of what their position is factually.

THE COURT: Well, I will let him state what their position is and see what -

MR. YNTEMA: Thank you, Your Honor. I am simply reciting the allegations of the complaint and what gave rise to our position as to the allegations of the complaint.

Again, the two grounds being the misrepresentations made on the application that would, in essence, in our position, void the policy *ab initio* from its beginning.

The second ground would be that there are certain exclusions that apply to conduct, mainly arson, on the property

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that would, in essence, exclude coverage for The Hammocks' claim.

For that reason, we determined that, being the fact that our argument would be that the policy is void ab initio, we thought, well, is this really property of the estate then. And our conclusion was, out of an abundance of precaution and respect for the automatic stay of this court, that we would pursue a motion for relief from automatic stay to file an action in the Western District to determine the rights and obligations of the parties under the policy and mainly asserting those two grounds, albeit in a voluminous manner with the complaint because the allegations in this case are voluminous and with voluminous exhibits because the evidence in this case is voluminous and we expect is going to be voluminous.

With that said, we approach the court today on several grounds in support of our motion for relief from stay, and they are essentially asserted under 362(d)(1), as the court is well aware, for cause. "For cause" is a flexible term and we want to come under that flexible umbrella and assert to the court that, in essence, the stay against Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, if there is one, prejudices them in their right to a jury trial in the Western District of North Carolina.

Also, we would like to proceed as quickly as we can

with our declaratory judgment action. Why? Well, the reason why is that the evidence is fresh now. In circumstances like this, myself and Mike Nelson, I am sure, is accustomed that, if an insurance carrier sends a letter of denial denying a specific claim in the case of a fire, it can be one, two, or three years before the debtor comes forward to assert a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the insurer is right.

In this case, we knew that this issue was not going to go away. We knew that it was of such a great figure, meaning over six million dollars, that this matter would have to be litigated. We had the evidence. We had the EUO. We have done our investigation. We didn't want to let that go stale.

So therefore we come forward now to pursue this matter in the Western District of North Carolina, and we have requested a jury trial, and we have not submitted ourselves to the jurisdiction of this court by submitting a proof of claim, although I don't think we would have any position to submit one in the first place.

Moving on from that, what we would like the court to consider is in my research - my research is that, under section 1334(c)(1), I kind of use that as guidance as to whether this court in its consideration can abstain from hearing this matter.

Now, there has been no adversary proceeding filed with

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this court, and that's our attempt to get a motion for relief from automatic stay so we can pursue this outside of this bankruptcy proceeding. But, in this circumstance, under section 1334(c)(1), there are several considerations that the court can make in deciding, well, should I abstain from this if it is brought before me, and it kind of lends credence to why a motion for relief from stay should be granted.

The first consideration is that this is not a core proceeding. I have read the response of Mr. Gray on behalf of the debtor, and it appears to me, and I may be speaking out of turn, but I don't think there is disagreement that this is not a core proceeding, that this is essentially - that this is not a core proceeding and essentially simply related to the bankruptcy. It is something that, if this court were to - if somehow the debtor were to come forward and file an adversary proceeding in this court and pursue this, that, in essence, the court would have to be asked to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that essentially would be reviewed de novo by the District Court in the end.

With that said, that would also affect our right to a jury trial, which we have requested in this case and which we think we are entitled to if and when we proceed in the Western District of North Carolina.

There is a Western District of North Carolina case, the *In re Florida Hotel Properties*, *Ltd.* case, which stated an

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action for breach of contract and other state law claims involved non-core proceeding and entitled the movant to the right to a jury trial, and that case is similar to ours. This is, in essence, a contractual dispute and it is an insurance contract. It is a contractual dispute. The Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, being a stranger to the bankruptcy, is entitled to a jury trial to be conducted by the District Court.

Again, I would like to reiterate the fact that this is a prepetition insurance contract, and I would take the court's attention to the *Pisgah Contractors*, *Incorporated*, case, which I think is an interesting case and one that lends credence to our position where it is stated that the bankruptcy judge does not have the authority to adjudicate a state law contractual claim arising out of a prepetition contract involving a party who has not filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding.

That's the exact situation that we have here. A prepetition policy was procured, issued, was in effect, and we are a stranger to this bankruptcy proceeding.

Lastly, and trying to be brief in my argument, the fact of the efficiency of this case, again I go back to we feel that this case, we will be able to move forward on the declaratory judgment action in an efficient manner in the District Court. Meaning if we get into the District Court and we are allowed to file it in the District Court, we will

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proceed by way of their discovery rules, by way of pretrial motions. The District Court will be handling that. Ron Payne, we expect, will be handling that for the debtor and be litigating that case outside of this bankruptcy case.

Once a determination is made, if the declaration is entered by way of court after a jury trial that there is coverage, then we will be back in this court to figure out how the disbursement is supposed to be - how the funds are supposed to be disbursed.

But as of now, all we are requesting is relief from stay to proceed in the Western District of North Carolina for a declaration as to, one, whether, in essence, the policy can be rescinded or it can be declared void ab initio due to misrepresentations on the application or whether certain coverage under the policy applies to exclude coverage for the claim that's being asserted.

If I can just ask to respond to any responses that are made to my argument. Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Gray.

MR. GRAY: Your Honor, obviously we haven't seen this and I am sort of glad I didn't because none of those cases have anything to do with this matter.

This obviously is a core proceeding. These are assets of the estate. They were assets of the estate before they burned. Now the insurance claim is an asset of the estate.

This entity, Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, is not a creditor in this proceeding, never will be a creditor in this proceeding. It is an insurer who has chosen not to deny the proof of loss. This is a clear indication on their part, and that's all that -

THE COURT: They have chosen not to deny the -

MR. GRAY: The claim for a loss. They have not denied that, and they don't want to do that. They have chosen this vehicle to try to avoid denying the claim because they don't have any grounds to deny the claim.

Mr. Payne and his group are waiting for a response from Harleysville Mutual Insurance. They don't get one. They never get one. What they get is this motion, which I guess at this point it would be a deemed denial. I guess you couldn't take it any other way.

They are ready to file the complaint now, waiting for the denial which they expected to come because it is an arson claim and most insurance companies do not like to pay off on arson claims, but they expected a denial and they never got one. They are ready to file their action.

This action has no merit at all for this proceeding, Your Honor. This is just an attempt to create another litigation. All of these allegations that have any merit at all, if they do, are defenses or affirmative defenses in a lawsuit that the debtor would file for the loss. One lawsuit

with all things in it. The debtor says we claim our loss against you. In their answer they are going to deny it and say and, by the way, we don't think we are covered. That's an affirmative defense in that type action. One lawsuit should take care of this.

In essence, what this is trying to say is we want to take time to find out whether we are insured and then we will decide whether to allow the lawsuit or deny the lawsuit at that time. This is not a lawsuit that says, oh, if we determine that the insurance policy is in effect, we have to pay. That's not what it says because they then would come back and say, well, if there is arson, we deny the claim.

The position of the debtor, debtor-in-possession here, is that this is one of the primary assets of the estate. It was the most valuable structure on the property of the debtor. This insurance company and insurance policy was clearly in effect when the fire took place, and we would say that there is just no grounds for relief from the stay. This is a core proceeding.

If you argue efficiency, efficiency is that you have one lawsuit that covers everything, and not - the lawsuit that the debtor/debtor-in-possession is now ready to file based on, I guess what we would say, as I indicated to Your Honor earlier, a deemed denial by Harleysville by filing this declaratory judgment action, but they never have denied the

claim, and they are trying, as I say, by this strategy, if we can call it that, to avoid doing that. And I think that is not good grounds for relief from the stay here. I don't think they should be allowed to file this action, and I think the debtor should be allowed to file its action and then they can raise these issues as appropriate defenses or affirmative defenses.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Mann, do you have anything?

MS. MANN: Just that the mortgage holders support the debtor on this issue.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. YNTEMA: If I could speak to just a few of those things now.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. YNTEMA: I may have Mr. Nelson speak as to some of the more factual insurance -

THE COURT: All right.

MR. YNTEMA: Again, as far as the plaintiff moving forward on an action, and I know Mr. Gray just spoke to that issue, in this case the burden is on the insurance carrier to show arson. The burden is on the insurance carrier to show receipt. That is the logical flow that we be the plaintiff in an action. We filed the action for declaratory judgment and then we fulfilled those two burdens. That's the logical posture of this case.

It is my understanding, and Mr. Nelson can detail this for the court, that there has been a letter sent to the debtor stating and refunding a premium based on our position that the policy was void from the beginning. We refunded the premium and sent them a check and in that letter we stated that we are essentially denying the claim and we will be pursuing, what I assume, legal recourse.

With regard to that - also, this is a non-core proceeding and, again, I cite the *Pisgah* case and then also the Fourth Circuit case of *Apex Corporation*, which I will just leave for the court to look at, which I do think - in *Apex Corporation*, again, my narrative shows is holding debtor's prepetition based contract claim against a party who had not filed a proof of claim in Bankruptcy Court was a non-core proceeding.

We fit right into that situation. This, again, is a prepetition policy, and I will not reiterate that, but it fits right into the *Apex* case, and it fits right into the *Pisgah Contractors* case.

Lastly, as far as the impact of the Western District Court's ruling on the insurance policy in this case, the impact, again I would direct the court's attention to the *U.S. Brass Corporation* case, which I cited in the appendix, and I do think that the case law I have handed up to the court is relevant. That case, and that is one of the only cases

nationwide that I could find, simply states that that's not the consideration that should be taken into account by the Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court should look at all of the other considerations, but that's not one of the considerations that should be taken into account in allowing an insurer to proceed or remove the reference to the District Court for trial and for litigation of the scope of coverage or of the coverage issues.

So I do not think that its, one, a consideration relevant to our motion for relief from the automatic stay.

I would like to have Mr. Nelson speak to any further details that he may want to add in response to the argument. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Nelson, do you have anything?

MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, my name is Michael Nelson.

Your Honor, counsel for the debtor seemed to refer to what we are trying to do as a two-step process, and that somehow that we are seeking first to determine whether or not there is a policy and then, after that, deal with the arson. He said a two-step process. That's the first I have heard of that. That's hardly the case, Your Honor. This is a declaratory judgment complaint. We are seeking to have the court grant our denial.

Typically in insurance cases such as this, the policy holder will assert that the insurer's position on this sort of thing has been rash, unreasonable, in bad faith, and we expect they will make those arguments if they file a complaint.

What insurers typically do to avoid those arguments that the denial was rash is seek the court's imprimatur that the denial of coverage should stand. This is one lawsuit which will seek to resolve all controversies between the debtor and the insurance company, all at once, and there is no reason this is going to be a delayed process or it is going to get done any quicker if we do it their way because what they will simply do, if they respond to our DJ complaint, is they are going to file cross-claims. They are going to file cross-claims for DJ, and they are going to file cross-claims for breach of contract, and they are probably going to file cross-claims for bad faith. Those are the kind of things that typically are decided in a case such as this.

There was also an argument that there are no grounds to deny. If you look at the declaratory judgment complaint we proposed, there is ample discussion there about why a denial is appropriate in this situation.

It is a complicated case. There is some chance that a lot of core evidence will dissipate. The Hammocks' business is not healthy right now. They are laying off employees, countless employees. Some of those employees are moving out of

state. We are going to lose a lot of valuable evidence. We won't have chances to take depositions of folks. If the business does fragment, we think the documents may disappear. Although we have requested documents, we would like the ability to subpoena further records.

I do expect this to be somewhat of a complicated process but also something that can get done pretty quickly at the District Court level.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. YNTEMA: If I may just speak to one more point?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. YNTEMA: I do not believe, and I may be speaking out of turn, but I do not believe that the petition reflects the policy as an asset of this case. That is one thing that I reviewed long ago, and I don't think it has been changed. So, therefore, I will just put that as a fact, at least, with regard to our argument.

MR. GRAY: We did list the fire claim as part of it because, even though the petition was ready to file prior to the fire, it was filed sometime after.

Once again, Your Honor, they have not denied the claim. They have denied coverage. They talk about some letter and the typical thing that an insurance company does in this particular situation is you don't have insurance with us and, by the way, you paid us a premium and now, a year later or two

years later, whatever it is, we are sending it back to you. That is not a denial of the claim.

THE COURT: All right. I think what I ought to do is essentially continue this hearing and give the debtor a chance to file its claim or its lawsuit. If you do that, I suspect you are going to end up in the same place, but it would seem to me that that is the better procedure to get started doing it.

I will continue this hearing until January 20<sup>th</sup>. If by then the debtor has filed its complaint, I will deny this motion. If the debtor hasn't filed its complaint by then, I will grant this motion. Okay.

MR. NELSON: Your Honor, may I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. NELSON: Your Honor, that deprives the rights of this insurance company to seek a court's review of its position and, in essence, it gives them the chance to shape the lawsuit the way they want to do that. We have a right to have the lawsuit framed the way we want to. We are entitled to go to court as a plaintiff and present our case as to why no coverage should be there. And by basically making us sit on the side, you are depriving us of a legal right, with all due respect. And what we would like to have the court consider is, if they are going to file a lawsuit, allow us to file this DJ at the same time.

THE COURT: I don't agree with you, and I think I will

19 deny your request. I think the thing to do is get all of the 1 2 issues teed up at once, and that the best way to start doing 3 that is with the claimant making a claim or the plaintiff 4 making a claim and going from there. I think, if we grant this 5 request at this point, we have got a real chance of the District Court saying, no, there is nothing here really to hear 6 7 until the plaintiff makes a claim, and then we have wasted six 8 months or so. 9 So I think this is the best way to get on with it. we will see where we go. Okay. And any rights that the 10 11 insurance company has can be litigated in that lawsuit. So I don't think anybody is giving up any rights. Okay. 12 13 MR. GRAY: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Would you do that order, Mr. Gray? MR. GRAY: I will. 15 MS. MANN: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 17 MR. YNTEMA: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Thank you all. 20 (Off the record in this matter at 11:44 a.m.)

## C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Patricia Basham

Patricia Basham, Transcriber

Date: November 19, 2009